Department of Defense Dependencies on Critical Infrastructure: Executive Summary , September 27 , 2024
September 27, 2024
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From the report: "Department of Defense (DoD) operations in the homeland, whether day-to-day or in support of urgent force projection, have always held some level of dependency on civilian-owned critical infrastructure. These dependencies have grown significantly since the end of the Cold War. Outsourcing of services (e.g., electricity, water, ground transportation) has been deemed more efficient, reliable, and cost effective for the Department. A similar model has been adopted by the service providers themselves, outsourcing many of their own support services and supplies to lower tier providers. As a result, DoD is dependent on increasingly fragile homeland infrastructure whose interdependencies are difficult to unravel, limiting visibility into infrastructure resiliency against intentional attacks or natural disasters.
Conflict is effectively underway as adversaries acquire ever-expanding access and prosecute sophisticated cyber operations against key civilian infrastructure targets. Their stated intent in both doctrine and practice is to disrupt or disable civilian infrastructure on which DoD depends. If their attacks on the homeland are successful on the scale and in the timeframes they seek, U.S. forces could be prevented from winning—or possibly even getting to—the forward fight altogether.
Adversaries are pursuing—indeed escalating—attacks on the homeland, especially in the cyber domain. Nonetheless, DoD characterizes the current situation as "competition" and not "conflict." Based on its numerous interactions with seniors in the Department, the Task Force concluded that continuing to believe we are in competition detracts from the reality we are already living and the urgency with which we must address it.
This study sought to bring together several factors: an understanding of how those infrastructure dependencies support the flow of forces and supplies from the homeland to prosecute DoD's war plans; if and how infrastructure operations could be threatened and compromised; the ensuing impact on theater operations; where operations could be seriously degraded; and what actions the Department should take to mitigate the consequences. In doing so, the study concluded that:"
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