


JAMES RYSEFF, JONATHAN WELCH, LEWIS SCHNEIDER

# Exploring Differences in Organizational Culture Within the Department of Defense



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## About This Report

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As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) turns to deal with the pacing threat posed by China, its leadership recognizes that it can no longer rely on its technological advantage to ensure victory. Instead, DoD leaders recognize that they must change the culture of the department to become more innovative and adaptive to overcome new threats. In this report, we analyze the organizational culture of communities within DoD to understand how the current culture can be characterized and how DoD's culture varies within the department. Building on this research could help DoD's leaders achieve their desired cultural change. The research reported here was completed in March 2023 and underwent security review with the sponsor and the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review before public release.

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## Summary

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As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) reorients itself for a new era of strategic competition, its leadership recognizes that the department must change the way it does business. On one hand, operational challenges loom as the United States' technological advantage over China erodes. On the other hand, DoD's acquisitions process does not produce the weapons that U.S. warfighters need in the time frame in which they need them. Many in DoD's leadership believe that, to overcome each of these challenges, the U.S. military needs to make a similar shift in its culture to become more innovative and adaptive.

### Key Findings

To successfully change an organization's culture, it helps to first understand it.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, we used text analytics to explore how organizational culture varied across the military services, what operational communities exist within DoD, and what types of guidance are given to the acquisition community.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, we drew three key findings from this analysis:

- **Overall, most military services and operational communities demonstrated a substantially greater affinity for *Hierarchy* (which emphasizes following established processes and procedures) compared with *Adhocracy* (which encourages experimentation, adaptation, and innovation).** This finding reinforces the conventional wisdom that associates military culture with Hierarchy traits and criticisms that these behaviors are inhibiting DoD from keeping pace with its potential adversaries.
- **At the same time, DoD does not have a monoculture.** Our analysis found meaningful variances in culture across the military services and operational communities within DoD. Leaders wishing to effect cultural transformation might build upon these relative differences to achieve more-rapid results.
- **There is little evidence that the most recent DoD acquisition regulations have changed the cultural signals being sent to the acquisitions workforce.** Guidance to

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<sup>1</sup> Organizational culture is influenced by both internal factors and external factors. Understanding what these influences are and what effect they have can be key to culture change.

<sup>2</sup> While our analysis does illustrate some influences on organizational cultures within DoD, this analysis should not be considered definitive on its own. Some organizations within DoD do not provide unclassified versions of these documents, which limits the scope of analysis we could conduct. Additionally, organizations—or subordinate groups within an organization—can sometimes develop a culture that is different in practice than the culture that doctrinal materials intend to create. Supplementing our approach with a “bottom-up” view of how the members of an organization perceive their organizational culture would provide a more comprehensive picture.

this community continues to emphasize the Hierarchy culture the most and the Adhocracy culture the least.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction

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As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) prepares for a new era of competition in which it must become prepared to fight and defeat near-peer adversaries, DoD's leadership recognizes that the U.S. military must do more than just acquire more-modern weapons or secure larger budgets. Instead, the changing nature of the threat requires that the U.S. military fundamentally change how it approaches warfare and how it approaches the acquisition of the tools needed to wage future conflicts.

On the operational side, top commanders have expressed concerns with how their organizations conduct themselves in their day-to-day affairs. As General Mark Milley observed while he was serving as the Army Chief of Staff, "I think we're overly centralized, overly bureaucratic, and overly risk averse, which is the opposite of what we're going to need in any type of warfare."<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Brown has called for the Air Force to "Accelerate Change or Lose." As he put it,

If we don't change—if we fail to adapt—we . . . risk losing a high-end fight. . . . We must empower our incredible Airmen to solve any problem. We must place value in multi-capable and adaptable team builders, and courageous problem solvers that demonstrate value in diversity of thought, ingenuity, and initiative.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the difficulty of preparing the military to adapt to new warfighting challenges, a long-standing, bipartisan consensus exists that similar problems plague the department's acquisition processes. In fiscal year 2016, the leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee jointly stated

An acquisition system that takes too long and costs too much is leading to the erosion of America's defense technological advantage. . . . In short, our broken defense acquisition system is a clear and present danger to the national security of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Despite attempts at reform and new regulations governing the acquisition process, these concerns have remained. The most recent National Defense Strategy observed that "Our current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical

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<sup>3</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Let Leaders Off the Electronic Leash: CSA Milley," *Breaking Defense*, May 5, 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Charles Q. Brown, Jr., *Accelerate Change or Lose*, U.S. Air Force, August 2020, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Senate Armed Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016," press release, May 14, 2015.



challenges we now face,”<sup>6</sup> echoing similar concerns expressed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.<sup>7</sup>

Each of the descriptions of the distinct challenges faced by DoD primarily frame these difficulties as stemming from the existing organizational culture of DoD. Organizational culture encompasses the “set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that are shared by members of an organization” and can be considered “a pattern of shared basic assumptions . . . learned by a group [and] . . . taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to . . . problems.”<sup>8</sup> Consequently, if the leadership of DoD wants to increase the workforce’s ability to adapt to new problems and threats, it could start by understanding what the current organizational culture of DoD is, what factors—both internal and external—cause that culture to vary within the department, and how organizations with other types of cultures might frame similar kinds of problems.<sup>9</sup>

The remainder of this report is organized into several chapters. In Chapter 2, we discuss four dimensions that can differentiate types of organizational culture and how an organization’s affinity for these dimensions can be measured. In Chapter 3, we apply these methods to different kinds of documents written by different communities within DoD. In Chapter 4, we describe the major takeaways from this analysis and consider how these results and these methods could support efforts by DoD leadership to achieve cultural change in the department.

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<sup>6</sup> DoD, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review*, October 27, 2022, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> DoD, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, 2018.

<sup>8</sup> Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Jossey-Bass, 2010, p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> Although organizational culture is often perceived as a “people problem,” the culture of an organization can be shaped by a variety of factors. On one hand, a culture is likely to attract individuals who feel compatible with it and repel individuals who clash with it (the attraction-selection-attrition model). On the other hand, external structural factors, such as the organization’s purpose and mission or laws and regulations that govern the organization, can have a substantial effect on the culture of an organization. Effective cultural change requires an understanding of the relative influence of both internal and external determinants of culture.

## Chapter 2. Methods

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### The Competing Values Framework

For this report, we used the Competing Values Framework (CVF) as an organizing structure for our analysis of organizational culture. This framework has been widely adopted by other academic researchers since its introduction and has an extensive body of research illustrating how it can be applied to corpora of documents from the organization being studied.<sup>10</sup>

The CVF separates types of organizational culture into four dimensions: Adhocracy, Hierarchy, Clan, and Market. An organization best characterized by the Adhocracy culture dimension has a flexible, externally oriented (i.e., focused on the world outside the organization) culture. These organizations see their employees as effective when they are creating new things and find their work to be meaningful and impactful. They typically value such traits as autonomy, growth, risk-taking, and creativity. An Adhocracy organization is seen as effective when employees are innovating and feel free to be creative and take risks.

The *Hierarchy* organizational culture dimension sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Adhocracy dimension. Organizations characterized by the Hierarchy culture prefer a stable, internally focused (i.e., focused on the organization and how it functions) culture. These organizations see their employees as effective when there are clear rules, roles, and regulations governing the behavior of their members and when employees conform to these expectations. They value such traits as formalization, routinization, conformity, and predictability. Overall, a Hierarchy organization sees itself as being effective when the organization is functioning efficiently and smoothly.

The *Clan* organizational culture dimension has a flexible, internally oriented culture. These organizations see their members as effective when employees trust the organization and are committed to its success. They value such traits as collaboration, support, teamwork, and employee involvement. Organizations characterized by the Clan culture see themselves as being effective when employees are satisfied and committed to the organization.

Finally, the *Market* organizational culture dimension sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Clan dimension. Organizations with the greatest affinity for this type of culture have a stable, externally oriented culture. These types of organizations believe that their members will be most effective when they have clear goals and metrics for their success and they are rewarded using these measures of performance. They value such traits as rivalry, achievement, aggression,

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<sup>10</sup> Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework*, Jossey-Bass, 2006.

and competition. Organizations characterized by the Market culture see themselves as being effective when they perceive themselves to be beating their competition.

In short, Adhocracy cultures do things *first*, Hierarchy cultures do things *right*, Clan cultures do things *together*, and Market cultures do things *fast*. Although the use of the word *competing* in the name of the CVF seems to indicate that these dimensions cannot coexist, in reality, these dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Nearly any real-world organization will exhibit some degree of affinity for each of these dimensions of organizational culture. However, the prominence of each dimension will vary across organizations. Consequently, if a real-world culture is described as an Adhocracy, that does not mean the organization does not have any processes or characteristics typical of the Hierarchy culture; it simply means that the way the organization behaves has a greater degree of commonality with the Adhocracy culture overall.<sup>11</sup>

The CVF's Adhocracy and Hierarchy dimensions specifically focus on the factors we are most interested in: whether an organization prefers to adapt and innovate or whether the organization prefers to follow established processes and procedures. Consequently, although many potential models for organizational culture exist and many dimensions of organizational culture could be analyzed, the CVF is a useful framework for our purposes.

## Keyness Testing

To explore indicators of how these dimensions of organizational culture might vary within DoD, we employed a text analytics approach to scan documents for language indicative of different dimensions of organizational culture. Because language is one of the primary ways that humans encapsulate and promulgate values, the specific language in written documents—especially documents that are intended to instruct members on core concepts from the organization or to reinforce what constitutes “correct” behavior within the organization—can be used to explore and describe the cultures of the organizations that create them.<sup>12</sup> Text mining and

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<sup>11</sup> Although the CVF is the most popular and widely used framework, as with any typology, it has some limitations as an analytic construct. Typologies inherently simplify complex real-world phenomena to provide clear, easily interpretable results, but this process can eliminate nuance and detail. Additionally, the CVF does not fully take into account cultural strength or the possibility of content overlap across its defined categories. Despite these limitations, the CVF is a useful starting point to assess organizational culture and establish hypotheses about the causal factors that might have influenced the development of an organization's culture. See Jennifer A. Chatman and Charles A. O'Reilly, “Paradigm Lost: Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Culture,” *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 36, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Steven Pinker, *The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature*, Viking, 2007; and Yla R. Tausczik and James W. Pennebaker, “The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods,” *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2010.

natural language processing techniques in particular are frequently used by researchers who seek to describe the culture of a specific organization.<sup>13</sup>

We measured the relative affinity for each of these dimensions of organizational culture through keyness testing. *Keyness testing* measures whether a keyword is overpresent or underpresent in one collection of documents relative to another. When these keywords are known to be associated with a particular dimension of organizational culture as defined by the CVF, finding keywords that occur more frequently in the documents from one organization compared with another—taking into account the difference in overall word counts between the two document sets—indicates a greater affinity for that type of organizational culture. If the keywords occur less frequently, then that indicates a weaker affinity for that cultural dimension in the first organization compared with the second.<sup>14</sup> By summing these results across a predefined set of keywords known to be associated with the four CVF organizational culture dimensions, we can quantitatively describe the differences in organizational culture contained within the document collections.

Keywords corresponding to each cultural dimension were primarily drawn and expanded from Voss and Ryseff.<sup>15</sup> The authors drew on and expanded keywords from multiple academic sources, including sources from the developers of the CVF.<sup>16</sup> The authors chose these sources to ensure that keywords are representative of the cultural dimensions described in the CVF. To expand on the keyword dictionary for the present study, the authors examined these sources again to add keywords that might have been overlooked in the initial study. Additional academic

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<sup>13</sup> Sheela Pandey and Sanjay K. Pandey, “Applying Natural Language Processing Capabilities in Computerized Textual Analysis to Measure Organizational Culture,” *Organizational Research Methods*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2019.

<sup>14</sup> We calculated the log-likelihood to determine whether results were statistically significant. A calculated log-likelihood of 10 or greater was considered statistically significant; a log-likelihood of less than 10 was not considered statistically significant. This calculation accounts for difference in the sizes of the two corpora.

<sup>15</sup> Nathan Voss and James Ryseff, *Comparing the Organizational Cultures of the Department of Defense and Silicon Valley*, RAND Corporation, RR-A1498-2, 2022.

<sup>16</sup> These academic sources include Cameron and Quinn, 2006; Kim Cameron, *An Introduction to the Competing Values Framework*, white paper, Haworth, 2009; Richard Erhardt, *Cultural Analysis of Organizational Development Units: A Comprehensive Approach Based on the Competing Values Framework*, dissertation, Georgia State University, 2018; and Chad A. Hartnell, Amy Yi Ou, and Angelo Kinicki, “Organizational Culture and Organizational Effectiveness: A Meta-Analytic Investigation of the Competing Values Framework’s Theoretical Suppositions,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 96, No. 4, July 2011.

sources were also examined,<sup>17</sup> including sources involving military contexts,<sup>18</sup> to gain a greater understanding of how the meaning of words within civilian and military organizational contexts can differ.

The team also used RAND-Lex, a text analysis tool, to identify other potential keywords within military documents.<sup>19</sup> Specifically, we compared different military doctrine and noted overpresent and underpresent words. Words determined to be aligned with one of the cultural dimensions were added to the keyword set. The final counts for the keywords were 38 for Adhocracy, 40 for Hierarchy, 29 for Clan, and 29 for Market.

## Selecting Factors for Analysis

DoD is a massive organization with a wide variety of component organizations performing vastly different functions. There are any number of variables that could correlate with differences in organizational culture within the department. We chose to focus on three variables, two on the operational side of DoD and one for the acquisitions community.

For the operational side of DoD, we focused on analyzing variations both across the military services and across warfighting communities within a single service. Each of the military services has a unique identity—one based on a perception of the warfighting needs the service addresses and one that it seeks to impart to the recruits that join the organization through initiation and training. Similarly, warfighting communities within a service exist to address a variety of distinct operational requirements and contexts. The variation in these military contexts might result in significant cultural differences within a service or it might not, if a dominant service culture were to override the pull of diverse warfighting missions. We sought to gather data to understand the potential impact of these factors.

For the acquisitions community, we chose to focus on how external factors (the regulations governing acquisitions and their interpretation) might have affected the guidance given to the

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<sup>17</sup> See Tianyuan Yu and Wu Nengquan, “A Review of Study on the Competing Values Framework,” *International Journal of Business and Management*, Vol. 4, No. 7, July 2009; and Leda Panayotopoulou, Dimitris Bourantas, and Nancy Papalexandris, “Strategic Human Resource Management and Its Effects on Firm Performance: An Implementation of the Competing Values Framework,” *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Christopher R. Paparone, *Applying the Competing Values Framework to Study Organizational Subcultures and System-Wide Planning Efforts in a Military University*, Pennsylvania State University, April 28, 2003; William J. Davis, Jr., “The United States Army: Values Based Organization, but What Values? Utilizing Competing Values Framework to Identify Cultural Incongruence Among Field Grade Officers,” *Symposium Report*, Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium, 2010, p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> RAND-Lex is the RAND Corporation’s proprietary suite of text analytic tools. For a full explanation of RAND-Lex and its capabilities, see Jennifer Kavanagh, William Marcellino, Jonathan S. Blake, Shawn Smith, Steven Davenport, and Mahlet Gizaw, *News in a Digital Age: Comparing the Presentation of News Information over Time and Across Media Platforms*, RAND Corporation, RR-2960-RC, 2019.

acquisition community over time. Because the acquisitions community is governed by laws that threaten significant consequences for disobedience and by regulations that are derived from these laws, it is logical that these external factors might play a significant role in shaping the observed culture of the acquisitions community. Consequently, we focused our research on understanding the impact of such factors instead of focusing on variations across or within the military services. In particular, because acquisition regulations have recently undergone significant revisions intended to make them more adaptive and agile, we organized our analysis around exploring whether we could detect changes in the cultural content of the acquisition regulations and their interpretations before and after these changes.

These variables are hardly the only factors we could have chosen to analyze. Some other promising factors to consider include

- the unit or organization's level in DoD's hierarchy (company, battalion, brigade, etc.)
- differences between operational forces, supporting organizations, and the institutional establishment
- the influence of individual commanders in establishing a distinct culture for their subordinate organizations
- differences in responsibilities and expectations of enlisted service members, noncommissioned officers, and officers
- differences between the active force, reserve force, National Guard, and DoD civilian staff
- the impact of external factors (such as major combat operations or reforms, including the Goldwater-Nichols Act) on DoD's organizational culture throughout its history.

However, we were limited by both our ability to access and analyze documents for an unclassified, uncontrolled report and our available time and budget. These restrictions forced us to exclude the Air Force and Navy from several of the analyses we performed because of the classification level of their documentation. It also prevented us from exploring unique organizations, such as the special operations community or cyber forces, which might have cultures that are relative outliers compared with other parts of DoD. Further study on this topic could yield additional insights that would deepen our understanding of the variations in organizational culture across DoD and which internal and external factors have played the greatest role in shaping those cultural variations.

## Selecting DoD Documents for Operational Communities

Next, the team identified types of documents that might yield insights into how organizational cultures vary across DoD. We did this in a multistep process. First, we brainstormed a list of all types of documents that might offer insights about organizational culture. Once we had a comprehensive list, we prioritized sources based on their potential fruitfulness given the parameters of our text analytics software and several additional factors that

might affect their practicality. We considered the following factors when ordering our potential sources:

- **Classification:** Were the documents wholly unclassified? (Documents marked For Official Use Only [FOUO] and Controlled Unclassified Information [CUI] would not be available for analysis given the scope of this study.)
- **Availability:** Could we access and compile the documents for analysis (i.e., were they publicly available?), and did we have the time and resources to collect them?
- **Comparability:** Could documents be compared across services and against joint documents?
- **Currency:** Were the documents current or might they be out of date and replaced by ideas that have yet to be formally published?
- **Representativeness:** Were these the best documents to offer data that generally reflect the culture of an organization?

With these factors in mind, we prioritized our list and broke it into three tiers.<sup>20</sup> We also needed to consider what time frame we wanted to explore. As with most text-based research, the further back in time you go, the more challenging and time-intensive the research is because fewer documents are digitized. We ultimately settled on a comparative contemporary look, a snapshot in time rather than a longitudinal look at one or more organizations. However, the latter approach could offer interesting insights related to organizational change over time in future research efforts.

We sought to select documents that would focus on two ways in which organizational culture is transmitted to the members of an organization. First, organizations typically have training or onboarding materials that teach members of the organization the “correct” way to approach their day-to-day responsibilities or problem-solving. Second, organizations usually have an evaluation process where members are judged as to whether their behavior is in line with the organization’s norms and expectations.

For training materials, we focused on concepts and doctrine. At the military service level, we selected both capstone and keystone concept documents. Capstone concepts provide the undergirding foundation for the joint force or a service, whereas keystone documents are generally aligned with articulating the contours of a specific joint or warfighting function.<sup>21</sup> Ideally, we would have reviewed and compared all services, but U.S. Navy doctrine is more difficult to access because it resides exclusively on the NIPRnet. The U.S. Air Force has limited publicly available operational doctrine, and it is understandably quite different from that of the ground forces. And finally, the relatively new U.S. Space Force has a capstone concept but is

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<sup>20</sup> See the full list and prioritization tiering in Appendix A.

<sup>21</sup> The Joint Doctrine Hierarchy Chart is extremely helpful in understanding these documents. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine Hierarchy Chart,” webpage, October 5, 2022. For additional information on service doctrinal hierarchies, see the footnotes for each service in Appendix A.

still developing its doctrine as it continues to establish itself. Ultimately, we chose to use joint doctrine as a baseline and compare U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine against that corpus. Additionally, we analyzed the Army Field Manuals (FMs) to explore variations in doctrine and culture across branches of a single service.

For evaluation materials, we used After Action Reviews (AARs) from exercises focused on warfighting. We analyzed AARs from major warfighting exercises for three of the services: the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. For the Air Force, we used the Red Flag exercise. For the Marine Corps, we used the 1st Marine Division's Steel Knight exercise. Finally, for the Army, we used AARs from exercises hosted at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin. We were unable to obtain AARs from U.S. Navy exercises in the sources available to the team.

In addition to the sources discussed here, the team also considered analyzing a variety of unofficial documents. Although official documents, such as published descriptions of organizational doctrine, reflect the organization's collective perspective and shape how new members are onboarded into the organization, unofficial sources can sometimes offer insight into discussions about how the organization's culture might change in the future or provide frank discussions about difficulties or challenges an organization faces with its culture. In the DoD context, unofficial documents might include newspaper articles, academic or think tank studies, journal articles (both academic and military), and papers written as part of a professional military education (PME) course. Although we did not extend our analysis to include these unofficial sources to limit this report's scope, future studies might find value in analyzing these types of documents for cultural indicators.

## Selecting DoD Documents for the Acquisition Community

In addition to analyzing the operational warfighting components of DoD, we explored how organizational culture varied for DoD acquisitions. For this analysis, we took a slightly different approach. Instead of analyzing how organizational culture varied across suborganizations or communities within DoD, we focused on analyzing whether organizational culture had changed in the acquisition community over time. In particular, the issuance of new regulations establishing the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (a name that seems to imply a desire to shift the acquisitions community toward a culture that looks more like an Adhocracy) resulted in a detectable shift in the cultural signals being sent to the acquisitions community.

We selected two types of documents for this analysis. First, we selected the acquisition regulations themselves. We compared the current versions of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.01 and 5000.02 and other regulations that implement acquisition pathways with older versions of



DoDD 5000.01 (issued between 1982 and 2007) and 5000.02 (issued between 1975 and 2015).<sup>22</sup> Additionally, we compared the most recent guidebook issued by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) (issued in 2021) with the previous version of the DAU Guidebook (issued in 2010) and acquisition guidebooks issued by other sources (issued between 1996 and 2018). Analyzing both of these document types—the formal regulations and the informal interpretation of those regulations in the guidebooks—allows us to understand both the theory and practice of the direction provided to the acquisition community.

One limitation of our analysis is the lack of any documents describing the output of the acquisition community. Extending this approach to such categories as finalized acquisition contracts or approved acquisition strategies might reveal whether there are any cultural variations between the guidance given to the acquisitions community and the reality of the lived experience of the acquisitions community. Unfortunately, these categories of documents are tightly controlled to prevent defense contractors from gaining an unfair advantage over the government or their competitors. Consequently, performing large-scale data analysis on these artifacts might prove to be difficult and was beyond the scope of this study.

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<sup>22</sup> DoDD 5000.01, *The Defense Acquisition System*, U.S. Department of Defense, September 9, 2020; DoDD 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework*, U.S. Department of Defense, January 23, 2020. Specifically, the other regulations consisted of DoDD 5000.74 (*Defense Acquisition of Services*), 5000.75 (*Business Systems Requirements and Acquisition*), 5000.80 (*Operation of the Middle Tier of Acquisition [MTA]*), 5000.81 (*Urgent Capability Acquisition*), 5000.82 (*Acquisition of Information Technology [IT]*), 5000.85 (*Major Capability Acquisition*), and 5000.87 (*Operation of the Software Acquisition Pathway*).

## Chapter 3. Results

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In this chapter, we present the results of the textual analysis. We discuss how the types of documents analyzed enhance our understanding of the organizational culture within DoD. We also display the results for the four dimensions of organizational culture we measured and illustrate how those measurements vary across the relevant suborganizations or time period on which we focused.

### Operational Documents

For operational documents, we analyzed both documents that attempt to establish “the right way” to accomplish tasks and documents that evaluate whether tasks have actually been done “correctly.” For the first type of document, we looked at doctrine. Capstone doctrine provides the undergirding foundation for the joint force or a service, while keystone doctrine and FMs are generally aligned with articulating the contours of a specific joint or warfighting function. In Table 3.1, we compare capstone and keystone doctrine for the joint force, Army, and U.S. Marine Corps. We show the number of keywords that adhere to each dimension or organizational culture.

**Table 3.1. Comparison of Capstone and Keystone Doctrine**

<b>Service</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Market</b>
Joint doctrine	535	1,792	1,519	1,010
Army doctrine	875	1,751	1,535	1,105
U.S. Marine Corps doctrine	740	1,080	833	1,531

NOTE: Values are the number of keywords per 100,000 words.

### *Capstone and Keystone Doctrine*

A couple of trends are notable in the analysis. First, while there is a great deal of convergence between joint doctrine and Army doctrine across most of the dimensions of organizational culture, which is not surprising given the Army’s outsized role in joint concept development,<sup>23</sup> Joint and Army doctrine have the greatest amount of divergence in the Adhocracy cultural dimension. In fact, both Army and Marine Corps doctrine demonstrate a

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<sup>23</sup> S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Rebeca Orrie, *Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services*, RAND Corporation, RR-2270-OSD, 2019, p. 38.

meaningfully greater degree of affinity for the Adhocracy dimension than Joint doctrine. It is possible that this trend would hold more generally and that units and organizations at lower levels of the DoD organizational structure might have a greater degree of affinity for Adhocracy traits than higher levels and larger organizations within DoD. Further research would be required to confirm or deny this possibility.

Second, Marine Corps doctrine is notable for its increased emphasis on the Market dimension of organizational culture and its reduced emphasis on the Hierarchy and Clan dimensions. Compared with Army doctrine, Marine Corps doctrine is more enemy-centric and focused on stoking competitive behaviors to ensure victory.

### *Army Field Manuals*

In addition to service-level doctrine and concepts, we wanted to explore how organizational culture might vary within a service. To do this, we analyzed Army FMs that align with Army branches and specialized functions. The specific FMs and branches analyzed are listed in Table 3.2.

**Table 3.2. Comparison of Army Field Manuals by Specialization**

<b>Specialization</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Market</b>
BCT operations <sup>a</sup>	514	1,348	1,338	1,788
Airborne <sup>b</sup>	286	1,160	1,078	846
Air defense <sup>c</sup>	380	1,571	1,451	1,142
Artillery <sup>d</sup>	440	1,252	1,937	1,296
Aviation <sup>e</sup>	418	1,443	1,630	1,351
Cyber and EW <sup>f</sup>	491	1,746	1,325	1,409
Engineers <sup>g</sup>	438	1,761	2,549	764

NOTE: Values are the number of keywords per 100,000 words. BCT = Brigade Combat Team; EW = electromagnetic warfare.

<sup>a</sup> Includes FM 3-90-1 (*Offense and Defense*), FM 3-96 (*Brigade Combat Team*), and FM 3-98 (*Reconnaissance and Security Operations*).

<sup>b</sup> Includes FM 3-21.38 (*Pathfinder Operations*) and FM 3-99 (*Airborne and Air Assault Operations*).

<sup>c</sup> Includes FM 3-01.44 (*Short-Range Air Defense Operations*) and FM 3-01 (*U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations*).

<sup>d</sup> Includes FM 3-09 (*Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations*).

<sup>e</sup> Includes FM 3-04 (*Army Aviation*).

<sup>f</sup> Includes FM 3-12 (*Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare*).

<sup>g</sup> Includes FM 3-34 (*Engineer Operations*).

Overall, we observe meaningful variations across all of the dimensions of organizational culture. Most Army branches demonstrate a greater affinity for the Clan dimension of organizational culture than the Hierarchy dimension, indicating that the Army often attempts to instill a culture focused on teamwork and collaboration through its official manuals.

Only the *Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare* manual reflects a substantially greater affinity for the Hierarchy culture than the Clan culture. Similarly, manuals concerning the operations of the Brigade Combat Team (which is most associated with the infantry and armor branches) stand out as having a stronger affinity for the Market dimension of organizational culture than the Clan or Hierarchy dimensions; this is unsurprising because these are the units tasked with locating, closing with or outmaneuvering, and destroying enemy formations.

Finally, every Army branch demonstrates a lower degree of affinity for the Adhocracy dimension of organizational culture than the other three dimensions. However, this might be influenced by the nature of the documents analyzed because manuals are typically intended to establish best practices and promote some degree of standardization across a large organization. Consequently, the relative variations across the Army branches might be more significant than the absolute values. Operations associated with the maneuver formations of the Army and the *Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare* components stand out as having the greatest affinity for the Adhocracy culture relative to the other Army components in this analysis.

### ***After Action Reviews***

Finally, we analyzed AARs made available through DoD's Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). Unlike the other sets of documents analyzed in this project, AARs are intended to provide feedback about the actual performance of units as they execute training exercises designed to prepare them for their warfighting function. Consequently, AARs provide a look at the ideas and concepts that military personnel focus on as they perform their duties in the real world and the feedback they receive while they are performing those functions, not just how they are supposed to perform those duties in theory.

We analyzed AARs from three of the five military services. For the Army, we focused on AARs evaluating the performance of different units during training rotations to the NTC at Fort Irwin between 2006 and 2019. For the Marine Corps, we gathered AARs evaluating the performance of different units during the annual Steel Knight training exercise for the 1st Marine Division between 2016 and 2022. Finally, for the Air Force, we gathered AARs evaluating the performance of units during the annual Red Flag exercise between 2011 and 2015. Navy AARs are not available in JLLIS at an unclassified level, and the Space Force is too new to have a meaningful set of AARs to analyze. Although we do not claim that our analysis of AARs is exhaustive—there are far more AAR documents written than we could hope to analyze in detail—this analysis shows what cultural dimensions are emphasized in some of the most-realistic annual training exercises. Table 3.3 shows the results of this analysis.

**Table 3.3. Comparison of After Action Reviews**

<b>Service</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Market</b>
Army (NTC rotations)	556	1,096	693	563
Marine Corps (Steel Knight)	625	1,084	948	472
Air Force (Red Flag)	184	513	240	1,116

NOTE: Values are the number of keywords per 100,000 words.

For the Army, the feedback for units training at the NTC primarily emphasizes traits associated with the Hierarchy dimension of organizational culture and a relatively similar degree of emphasis for the other three cultural dimensions. In contrast, Marine Corps AARs from the Steel Knight exercise tend to emphasize elements of the Hierarchy and Clan dimensions to a similar extent. Finally, Air Force AARs from the Red Flag exercise emphasize elements of the Market dimension to a much greater degree than the other AARs analyzed.

## Acquisition Documents

### *Acquisition Regulations*

To apply an organizational culture lens to the direction that acquisitions officers have been receiving over time, we analyzed the language in two different types of documents. First, we compared the most recent series of acquisition regulations with previous versions of the acquisition regulations issued over the past 40 years.<sup>24</sup> The results are given in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4. Comparison of Acquisition Regulations**

<b>Regulation Set</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Market</b>
Current regulations (2020)	444	1,976	570	1,052
Older regulations (1975–2015)	421	2,358	778	1,313

NOTE: Values are the number of keywords per 100,000 words.

As Table 3.4 shows, the new regulations do have a slightly greater emphasis on concepts associated with the Adhocracy dimension of organizational culture: However, the change is modest and is not statistically significant given the size of the document corpora compared. Although the new regulations demonstrate a lesser degree of affinity for the Hierarchy dimension

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<sup>24</sup> The most recent series of acquisition regulations included the most recent version of DoDD 5000.01, DoDD 5000.02, and the new regulations that were intended to provide greater flexibility to acquisitions professionals (5000.74, 5000.75, 5000.80, 5000.81, 5000.82, 5000.85, and 5000.87). The previous versions of the regulations issued over the past 40 years included versions of DoDD 5000.01 issued between 1982 and 2007 and versions of DoDD 5000.02 issued between 1975 and 2015.

of organizational culture, it remains far and away the area of greatest emphasis. The Market culture dimension—which focuses on competition to drive measurable results—remains the second-most-important aspect of organizational culture in the language of the DoD acquisition regulations.

### *Acquisition Guidebooks*

In addition to analyzing the official DoD regulations—which might have a greater affinity for the Hierarchy dimension of organizational culture because of the reality that they are formal guidance intended to instruct DoD acquisitions officers on what they can and cannot do—we analyzed guidebooks created by various organizations to interpret these regulations. We group these guidebooks in three ways. First, we analyze the most recent guidebook issued by the DAU in 2021. We compare this with the previous guidebook issued by DAU in 2010. Finally, we compare both DAU guidebooks with a set of other guidebooks issued between 1996 and 2018. The results are given in Table 3.5.

**Table 3.5. Comparison of Acquisition Guidebooks**

<b>Guidebook Set</b>	<b>Adhocracy</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Clan</b>	<b>Market</b>
DAU 2021	593	2,407	944	1,640
DAU 2010	537	2,551	1,068	1,606
Other guidebooks <sup>a</sup>	630	2,116	937	1,387

NOTE: Table cell values are given as number of keywords per 100,000 words.

<sup>a</sup> These guidebooks are Army Pamphlet 70-3, Army Acquisition Procedures, March 2014; Defense Acquisition Program Support Methodology Guidebook, version 2.0, January 2009; DIUx Commercial Solutions Opening How-to Guide, November 2016; DoD Guide to Integrated Product and Process Development, February 1996; Defense Systems Management College Acquisition Strategy Guide, December 1999; Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition in DoD, December 2000; Incentive Strategies for Defense Acquisitions, January 2001; Human Systems Integration and Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Handbook for Pre-Milestone A Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and Analysis of Alternatives Activities, March 2014; Challenge-Based Acquisition, 2020; Defense Agile Acquisition Guide, March 2014; NavAir Acquisition Guide 2014/2015, October 2013; Acquisition Strategy Decision Guide, January 2001; Acquisition Program Structure Guide, January 2001; Handbook for Procuring Digital Services Using Agile Processes, August 2014; Acquisition Program Structure Guide, February 2004; Navy/Marine Corps Acquisition Guide, September 2007; and Simplified Acquisition Procedures Guide, April 2018.

As with the formal acquisition regulations, the changes in emphasis between the most recent DAU guidebook and older guidebooks—both those issued by DAU and by other acquisition organizations—are relatively modest. As with the regulations themselves, the most prominent dimension of organizational culture is the Hierarchy dimension, followed by the Market dimension. We do not see a meaningful shift toward Adhocracy (with its focus on innovation and adaptability) following the issuance of the most recent acquisition regulations; in fact, some of the older guidebooks actually have a greater affinity for Adhocracy compared with the most recent DAU guidebook.

## Chapter 4. Conclusions

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Given the analysis presented in this report, we draw the following conclusions:

- **Overall, most of the military services and operational communities we analyzed demonstrated a substantially greater affinity for Hierarchy than Adhocracy.** This finding reinforces the conventional wisdom that military culture typically has a greater affinity for Hierarchy traits (with their emphasis on conformity and an adherence to established rules and procedures) compared with Adhocracy traits (which instead emphasize creativity, adaptability, and risk-taking). At the same time, the nature of the analysis might skew the results toward the Hierarchy dimension; after all, the purpose of most of these documents is to tell new members how they should behave and establish standard operating procedures. Even so, these results emphasize the scale of the challenge in changing the values held by an organization as large as DoD.
- **At the same time, DoD does not have a monoculture.** Our analysis shows meaningful variations across the military services and operational communities within DoD for the values that these entities instill in their members and the way they think about solving problems. Consequently, if DoD leadership wants to change the department's culture, they will find that some communities already have a greater affinity for the desired end culture. The members of these subcultures could be valuable change agents and allies for a larger effort to transform DoD's organizational culture. Mapping the organizational culture of DoD at a lower level of the organizational structure could also provide a greater body of evidence to determine which factors have had the greatest impact on shaping the organizational culture throughout the department.
- **The most significant relative variations in organizational culture are between operational communities that emphasize the Clan culture and those that emphasize the Market culture.** In a military context, these cultures offer very different theories of victory. Market cultures will be enemy-centric and focus their efforts on winning the external competition. Clan cultures will place a greater focus on teamwork and collaboration, trusting that building a strong and effective team will be more important than excessively focusing on countering every action an adversary is taking. Further research could help determine when each philosophy is most effective in a military context.
- **There is little evidence that the most recent updates to DoD's acquisition regulations have sent a signal to DoD's acquisition workforce supporting a change in the direction of the Adhocracy organizational culture dimension.** Both the formal regulations and the most influential training materials exhibit little change in their relative emphasis on traits associated with agility, adaptability, and innovation. Instead, guidance to the acquisition workforce continues to emphasize Hierarchy concepts—which are associated with formalization, conformity, and predictability—to a greater degree than any other dimension of organizational culture. Given this, it seems unlikely that the acquisition workforce will meaningfully change how they approach defense acquisitions as a result of these new regulations.

Although the evidence presented in this study builds up our understanding of DoD's organizational culture and how it might vary within the department, much remains to be done to fully explore this topic. Because our study was limited to unclassified, publicly available documents, it could not apply this approach to all of the military services or to such suborganizations as the cyber community or the special operations community, which might be of particular interest when considering how organizational culture varies across DoD. Additionally, we considered three factors that might affect organizational culture across DoD:

1. which military service members belong to (e.g., Army, Marine Corps, Air Force)
2. which operational community members belong to
3. whether external factors (such as the acquisition regulations) affect culture over time.

Various other factors that could affect culture remain unexplored. For example, where a unit sits in the military's hierarchy (e.g., company, battalion, brigade) might affect the organizational culture of the unit—but we did not have the available budget or data sources to explore this factor. Additionally, alternative methods—such as surveying military service members about the culture in their unit or parsing the feedback given on promotion decisions or annual evaluations for cultural indicators—could expand our understanding of the organizational culture service members experience from day to day. Given the importance leadership at all levels of DoD and stakeholders outside DoD place on shifting its culture to become more adaptive and less bureaucratic, fully exploring why and how the culture of DoD changes across the organization could prove essential in helping the department's leadership understand where the culture of DoD is nearer to or farther from the culture they wish to cultivate and what factors correlate with the cultural traits they wish to promote.



## Appendix A. Full List of Documents Considered

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Given the limited scope of this study, we were able to sample only some of the documents that might be useful to our analytical approach. Below is the full list of documents we considered, prioritized using the factors addressed in the methodology section of this report.

### Prioritization of Potential Documents for Text Analysis

- Priority 1
  - Concepts: what services aspire to do
  - Doctrine: how the services do business (operationally and tactically)
    - Formal doctrine vs. informal doctrine
  - Instructions and directives (DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs)
  - Orders and regulations.
- Priority 2
  - Task lists: specific skills that units and individuals train to
  - AARs (sample)
  - Testimony: focus on annual updates to Congress
  - Journal articles (military-sanctioned or -affiliated)
  - PME papers (Defense Technical Information Center [DTIC])
  - Lessons Learned Reports (e.g., JLLIS) and/or service lessons learned repositories, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) or the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL).
- Priority 3
  - Studies: federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), Congressional Research Service (CRS), think tanks
  - Journal articles (outside military, e.g., *War on the Rocks*, *Small Wars Journal*)
  - Administrative messages
  - Newspaper articles.

### Concept and Doctrine Documents Reviewed

- Joint<sup>25</sup>
  - Capstone concepts
    - Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Doctrine

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<sup>25</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine Publications,” webpage, undated.

- JP 1, Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting
  - JP 1, Vol. 2, The Joint Force
- Keystone publications
  - JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support
  - JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence
  - JP 3-0, Joint Operations
  - JP 4-0, Joint Logistics
  - JP 5-0, Joint Planning
  - JP 6-0, Joint Communications Systems
- U.S. Army<sup>26</sup>
  - Army Doctrinal Publications (ADP) 1, *The Army*
    - ADP 1-01, Doctrine Primer
  - ADP 2-0, Intelligence
  - ADP 3-0, Operations
    - ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations*
    - ADP 3-07, *Stability*
    - ADP 3-19, *Fires*
    - ADP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*
    - ADP 3-37, *Protection*
    - ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*
  - ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*
  - ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*
  - ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*
    - ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*
  - ADP 7-0, *Training*
- U.S. Marine Corps<sup>27</sup>
  - Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting*
  - MCDP 1-0, *Operations*
    - MCDP 1-1, *Strategy*
    - MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning*
    - MCDP 1-3, *Tactics*
    - MCDP 1-4, *Competition*
  - MCDP 2, *Intelligence*
  - MCDP 4, *Logistics*
  - MCDP 5, *Planning*
  - MCDP 7, *Learning*

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<sup>26</sup> Army Publishing Directorate, “Army Doctrine Publications,” webpage, undated.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Publications Electronic Library (MCPEL),” webpage, undated; Marine Corps University Research Library, “Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications,” webpage, last updated January 20, 2023.

- MCDP 8, *Information*
- U.S. Navy [Unable to obtain doctrine]
- U.S. Air Force<sup>28</sup>
  - Doctrine Primer
  - Air Force Doctrinal Publication (AFDP) 1, The Air Force
  - AFDP 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
  - AFDP 3-0, Operations and Planning
  - AFDP 4-0, Combat Support
- U.S. Space Force.<sup>29</sup>

We also considered U.S. Coast Guard and NATO doctrine but determined these to be out of scope for this study. However, their documents might prove useful for subsequent research in this space.

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<sup>28</sup> U.S. Air Force Doctrine, homepage, undated.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Space Force, *Space Capstone Publication: Spacepower, Doctrine for Space Forces*, June 2020.

## Appendix B. Keyword Lists

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**Table B.1. Adhocracy Keywords**

<b>Keyword Stem</b>	<b>Examples of Included Words</b>
Adapt	Adaptive, adapted, adapt, adaptation, adaptable
Adjust	Adjust, adjustment, adjustments, adjusting
Agile	Agile, agility
Alternative	Alternative, alternatively
Ambiguity	Ambiguity, ambiguous
Anticipate	Anticipate, anticipated, anticipation, unanticipated
Autonomous	Autonomy, autonomous, autonomously
Change	Change, changing, changed
Create	Create, creating, creates
Creative	Creative, creatively, creativity
Cutting-edge	Cutting-edge
Decentralize	Decentralize, decentralizing, decentralized
Empower	Empower, empowered
Entrepreneurship	Entrepreneurship
Evolve	Evolve, evolving, evolution, evolved
Experiment	Experimental, experimented, experimentation
Explore	Explore, exploring, explored
Flexible	Flexible, flexibly, flexibility
Free	Free, freely, freedom, freeing
Future	Future
Imagine	Imagine, imagination
Improve	Improve, improvement, improving
Improvise	Improvise, improvising, improvised
Initiative*	Initiative
Innovate	Innovate, innovation, innovative, innovatively
Iterate	Iterate, iterative, iteration
Non-traditional	Non-traditional, non-traditionally
Opportunity	Opportunity, opportunities
Pioneer	Pioneer, pioneering
Prototype	Prototype, prototyping
Radically	Radically
Revolutionary	Revolutionary
Risk*	Risk, risky, risks
Stimulate	Stimulate
Temporary	Temporary, temporarily
Uncertain	Uncertain, uncertainty
Variety	Variety
Vision	Vision

NOTE: Keywords with an asterisk were used only for operational documents. Keywords with a hash mark were used only for acquisition documents.

**Table B.2. Hierarchy Keywords**

<b>Keyword Stem</b>	<b>Examples of Included Words</b>
Accountable	Accountable, accountability
Authority	Authority, authorities
Authorize	Authorize, authorization, unauthorized
Centralize	Centralize, centralization
Conform	Conform, conformity
Consequences	Consequences
Consistent	Consistent, consistency, consistently, inconsistent
Constrain	Constrain, constrained
Constraint	Constraint, constraints
Control	Control, controlled, controlling
Detail <sup>#</sup>	Detail, detailing, detailed
Discipline	Discipline, disciplined, disciplining
Efficient	Efficient, efficiency, efficiently, efficiencies, inefficient
Formal	Formal, formalize, formally
Hierarchy	Hierarchy, hierarchical
Mandate	Mandate, mandatory, mandating
Monitor	Monitor, monitoring, monitored
Obey	Obey, obedience
Organization	Organization, organizational
Oversee	Oversee, oversight, oversaw
Policy	Policy, policies
Precedence	Precedence
Precise	Precise, precision, precisely
Predictable	Predictable, predictably, predictability
Procedure	Procedure, procedural, procedures
Process	Process, processes
Regulation	Regulation, regulating, regulations
Reliable	Reliable, reliably, reliability, unreliable
Replicate	Replicate, replicable, replicating, replication
Require	Require, requirement, requiring
Restrict	Restrict, restriction, restricted, restrictive
Risk <sup>#</sup>	Risk, risky, risk-mitigation, risking
Rule	Rule, rules
Specify	Specify, specified, specification
Stable	Stable, stability, stabilize
Standard	Standard, standardized, non-standard, standardization
Strict	Strict, strictly
Structured	Structured
Tradition	Tradition, traditionally
Uniformity	Uniformity

NOTE: Keywords with an asterisk were used only for operational documents. Keywords with a hash mark were used only for acquisition documents.

**Table B.3. Clan Keywords**

<b>Keyword Stem</b>	<b>Examples of Included Words</b>
Affiliation	Affiliation
Attach	Attach, attached
Cohesion	Cohesion, cohesive
Collaborate	Collaborate, collaboration, collaborative
Collective	Collective, collectively
Commit	Commit, committed, commitment
Communicate	Communicate, communicates, communicating
Consensus	Consensus
Cooperate	Cooperate, cooperation, cooperative
Coordinate	Coordinate, coordinating, coordination, coordinator
Dedication	Dedication, dedicate, dedicating
Discuss	Discuss, discussion, discussing
Facilitate	Facilitate, facilitating, facilitation
Involve	Involve, involving, involves, involvement
Loyal	Loyal, loyalty
Member	Member, membership
Mentor	Mentor, mentorship
Morale	Morale
Mutual	Mutual, mutually
Organic	Organic, organically
Participate	Participate, participating, participation
Relationship	Relationship, relationships
Share	Share, shared
Support	Support, supporting, supports
Team	Team, teamwork, teaming
Together	Together
Tribe	Tribe, tribal
Trust	Trust, trusted, trustworthy, entrust
Voice	Voice, voiced

NOTE: The keyword *discussion* was excluded in some instances because it was a section header in templates used to generate the type of document, not a reference to organization members having a discussion.

**Table B.4. Market Keywords**

<b>Keyword Stem</b>	<b>Examples of Included Words</b>
Achieve	Achieve, achieving, achievement, achievable
Adversary	Adversary, adversary's, adversaries, adversarial
Aggressive	Aggressive, aggression, aggressively, aggressiveness
Compete	Compete, competition, competitive
Cost	Cost, low-cost, high-cost, costs, cost-effective, costlier
Customer	Customer
Deliver	Deliver, delivery, delivering, deliverables
Demand	Demand, demanded, demanding

<b>Keyword Stem</b>	<b>Examples of Included Words</b>
Enemy	Enemy, enemies, enemy's
Environment	Environment, environments, environmental
Exchange	Exchange, exchanged, exchanges
External	External, externally
Fast	Fast, faster, fast-paced
Goal	Goal, goals
Market	Market, marketplace, market-proven
Objective	Objective, objectives
Opponent	Opponent
Outpace	Outpace, outpaced
Outperform	Outperform, outperformed
Perform	Perform, performance, performing
Position <sup>#</sup>	Position, positioned, positioning
Productivity	Productivity
Quality	Quality
Rapid	Rapid, rapidly, rapidity
Result	Result, resulting, resulted
Speed	Speed
Superiority	Superiority
Target <sup>#</sup>	Target
Threat	Threat, threats, threatened, threatens

NOTE: Keywords with an asterisk were used only for operational documents. Keywords with a hash mark were used only for acquisition documents. Some keywords in the "deliver" group were excluded from some operational documents because they referred to the act of delivering cargo (the "to bring and hand over" definition of *deliver*) as opposed to accomplishing a meaningful task (the "to provide something promised or expected" definition of *deliver*).

## Abbreviations

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AAR	After Action Review
CVF	Competing Values Framework
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
FM	Field Manual
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
NTC	National Training Center
PME	professional military education



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As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) pivots to deal with the pacing threat posed by China, its leadership recognizes that it can no longer rely on its technological advantage to ensure victory. Instead, DoD's leaders recognize that they must change the culture of the department to make it more innovative and adaptive in order to overcome new threats. The authors of this report analyzed the organizational culture of communities within DoD to understand how the current culture could be characterized and how DoD's culture varies within the department. Building on this research could help DoD's leaders achieve their desired cultural change.

For this report, the authors used the Competing Values Framework (CVF) as an organizing framework for their analysis of organizational culture. The CVF differentiates among types of organizational culture and categorizes it into four dimensions: Adhocracy, Hierarchy, Clan, and Market. An Adhocracy culture dimension has a flexible, externally oriented culture; a Hierarchy culture has a stable, internally focused culture; a Clan culture has a flexible, internally oriented culture; and a Market culture has a stable, externally oriented culture.

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